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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
ROBERT DEAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020180-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals the restitution order of $577/75 imposed after his conviction for 
automobile theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-6-404 (1999), 
and unauthorized control of a vehicle for an extended time, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (Supp. 2001). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2Xc) (Supp. 2001). 
IgSVg f HESENTEP Of* A*> FEAi AM> STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Was the trial court within its discretion in ordering defendant to pay 
$577.75 in restitution to the owner of a car damages by defendant's criminal conduct? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's restitution order is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, f 6,992 P.2d 995. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RUT FS 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (1999), a copy of which is attached as 
Addendum A, is dispositive in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 1,2001, defendant was charged by information with two criminal 
counts: second and third degree felony theft (R. 2). On November 29, 2001, pursuant to a 
plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of automobile theft and one count of 
unauthorized control of a vehicle for an extended time (joyriding), a class A misdemeanor 
(R. 35-36). 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of one year and zero-to-five years in 
the Utah State Prison (R. 35). Following a hearing, defendant was also ordered to pay 
$577.75 in restitution to cover damage to the vehicle while it was under his control (R. 
55,65:28). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 57). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Even though a functional vehicle became completely useless during a week in 
defendant's care, he does not believe he owes the owner of the car any money (R. 8,22, 
27). 
1
 '"On appeal, the facts are recited in a light most favorable to the [judge's 
ruling].'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 79 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
2 
The owner of the car, Donald Seth Johnson, believes otherwise, although he does 
not claim to know how defendant destroyed the vehicle (R. 65:11). "All I know is, when 
I got my car back, it didn't work'* (id.). Before defendant "borrowed" Johnson's car on 
May 31, 2002, promising to return it the next day, the vehicle was functional, if not 
entirely trouble-free. Johnson acknowledged that the vehicle, a Suburu GL 10, was a 
1986 model, had been driven approximately 170,000 miles and that the starter sometimes 
needed a little prompting with a hammer before the car would turn over (R. 65:9, 10). 
Nonetheless, he had owned the car for a year and it "was in driving condition. I mean it 
went forward. It stopped" (R. 7). He took the Suburu to work and drove it from the 
Provo area to St. George and back with no mechanical problems (R. 64:5, 65:7,9,18). 
When defendant did not return the vehicle as promised, Johnson reported it stolen 
(R. 65:6). On June 5,2001, the abandoned Suburu was discovered at a car dealership in 
Provo, where defendant had left it while he was supposedly taking a Nissan Altima for a 
"test drive" (R. 64:5). Defendant drove the Altima to Mexico, where it was stolen (id.). 
After recovering his car from the impound lot, Johnson immediately noticed a 
difference. "[T]he acceleration was shot. There was a leak somewhere in the exhaust. 
Just the feel of the car was different" (R. 65:16). Two days later, the car stopped running 
(R. 65:8). Johnson took the car to a mechanic, who charged him $1,200.44 for parts and 
labor (R. 62). Two weeks later, the transmission blew up and Johnson bought a new car 
(R. 65:8-9). 
3 
Defendant stated he could not have caused any of the damage because he had 
merely driven the car "around Provo," covering less than 100 miles (R. 65:22). 
Moreover, according to defendant, "[t]here was a lot of [pre-existing] problems with that 
car" (R. 65:20). However, the starter problem and worn out brake pads were the only 
defects defendant could specifically recall that existed before he "borrowed" the car (id.). 
At the conclusion of the restitution hearing, the trial court ruled that some of the 
damage to the vehicle was attributable to defendant's criminal conduct and, therefore, he 
should pay for some of the repairs (R. 65:27). By adding the sums Johnson spent for the 
repairs and subtracting that amount from the total repair bill, the court concluded that 
defendant should pay $577.75 in restitution (R. 65:28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court's restitution order was carefully formulated and well-
supported by the record Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the 
restitution order should be affirmed 
Point II: Even if defendant could show that the record did not establish a direct 
causal connection between defendant's admitted criminal conduct and Ithe damages to the 
car, the trial court still acted appropriately because restitution can be imposed for 
rehabilitative purposes. Accordingly, the trial court's restitution order should be 
affirmed. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Admittedly, the vehicle defendant stole was not in vintage condition. It was a 
1986 model, had been driven an estimated 170,000 and had some mechanical problems. 
Nonetheless, it ran. After defendant had driven it for a week, it did not. In fact, after a 
week in defendant's possession, the car had manifested numerous additional mechanical 
problems which ultimately rendered it beyond repair. The trial court's restitution order 
was well within its discretion and should not be disturbed by this court. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY 
RESTITUTION. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay the costs of 
repairing the damaged vehicle. Under Utah law, 
[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to another sentence 
it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, 
or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4Xa)(i) (1999) (emphasis added). "Restitution" includes 
"full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,..." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-20l(lXd). "Pecuniary damages" means 
all special damages, but not general damages, which a person 
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising 
out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal 
activities and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses. 
5 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(c). Before restitution may be awarded, a trial court must 
establish a "nexus" between the victim's pecuniary losses and the actions of the 
defendant. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, fflf 3-5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per 
curiam). 
A restitution order should be upheld unless the trial court's findings were an abuse 
of discretion. Seet e.g., State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, f 6, 992 P.2d 995 (order 
of restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978) ("Before this Court will overturn the sentence given by the trial court, it 
must be clear that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse 
of discretion"). Moreover, "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects 
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if 
it can be said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id.; 
accord State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,128,27 P.3d 1133. 
Restitution is proper even when a defendant's responsibility for the damage is 
based on circumstantial evidence. Burke v. State, 410 S.E.2d 164,165 (Ga. App. 1991). 
In Burke, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution for repairs to a vehicle which he 
admitted stealing. Id. On appeal, the defendant claimed he could not be held accountable 
for the damage to the vehicle because he had only admitted to stealing it, not damaging it. 
Id. at 165. The appeals court disagreed, noting that the state's restitution statute allowed 
recovery for "'all damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil 
6 
action . . . based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced,..." Id. 
(citation and emphasis omitted). The court reasoned that: 
the owner testified that the car was in good condition when it 
was stolen and that it was found abandoned in a ditch, in 
damaged condition, the day after it was stolen. Appellant 
admitted stealing the car. This evidence, although 
concededly circumstantial, supports the conclusion that the 
damage to the car was proximately caused by the unlawful act 
for which appellant was sentenced, Le., appellant's theft of the 
car... It follows that the trial court was authorized to order 
appellant to pay restitution for the damage. 
Id. 
During the restitution hearing in this case, the trial court heard testimony from 
defendant and Johnson, the former owner of the car. Johnson acknowledged that the car 
had mechanical problems when he loaned it to defendant on June 2,2001. "Starter 
sometimes would be a little on the fritz, but, I mean, it would start up. Just give it a 
second and a tap with a hammer (R. 65:9). Otherwise, "[i]t was in driving condition. I 
mean, it went forward It stopped" (R.65:7). 
After recovering the car, Johnson immediately noticed additional problems. 
"[T]he acceleration was shot- There was a leak somewhere in the exhaust. Just the feel 
of the car was different" (R. 65:16). Two days later, the car stopped running (R. 65:8). 
Johnson took the car to a mechanic, who made the following repairs: 
1 Starter $110.21 
1 Alternator 124.94 
4 SparkPlugs 17.36 
1 Wire Set 25.70 
1 Distributor Cap 3.50 
7 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Vz 
Brake Pads 
Rotors 
Battery 
Battery Terminals 
Fuel Filter 
CVAxle 
Water Pump 
Gallon Antifreeze 
30.00 
139.59 
65.00 
3.00 
19.00 
89.02 
86.07 
6.50 
See copy of State's Exhibit No. 1 (receipt from Milt's Auto Repair & Muffler) (R. 62) 
attached as Addendum B. The grand total for labor and parts was $1,200.44 (id.). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that defendant was 
responsible for some of the damage and, accordingly, should pay for some of the repairs 
(R. 65:27). The court found that defendant was not responsible for replacing the starter, 
the alternator, the brake pads, the two rotors, the battery and cables or amy of the labor 
associated with making those repairs (R. 65:28). The court subtracted the total for those 
repairs - $622.69 - from the total of $1,200.44 and ordered defendant to pay the 
remaining $577.75 as restitution. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay the 
restitution because it is not the case that "no reasonable man would take the view adopted 
by the trial court/5 Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The court was careful to attribute to 
defendant only those repairs that were "directly related to the time frame of his use and 
the amount of his use. The others that were excluded are not consistent with the 
testimony that would require [defendant] to have to pay for those items" (R. 65:30). 
Indeed, the court gave defendant the benefit of the doubt on replacement of the rotors, the 
8 
alternator and the battery and cables, even though defendant did not specifically deny 
responsibility for those items. In short, the court's findings were well-founded, careful 
and well within its discretion. The restitution order should not be disturbed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED 
DEFENDANT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIM FOR 
DAMAGES TO THE VEHICLE-
Defendant claims he should not have been ordered to pay restitution to the victim 
because "the trial court abused its discretion in . . . arbitrarily ordering him to pay the 
costs of repair on some of the car parts without first establishing a causal relationship 
between his joyriding and the need to replace/repair these specific parts." Aplt. Br. at 7. 
This claim is without merit. 
As demonstrated in section I above, the trial court's decision was not arbitrary. 
The court was careful to hold defendant responsible only for those repairs that could be 
tied to his actions. However, even assuming that the State did not meet its burden in 
showing defendant's theft and joyriding caused the damage to the car, the trial court's 
order of restitution is still valid because compensating the victim of a crime is not the 
only goal of restitution. It is within the discretion of the trial court to consider the 
rehabilitative and deterrent effects of restitution upon the defendant. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201(8XcXiii) and State v. Tmtchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) ("[T]he 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering rehabilitative and deterrent purposes 
and ordering restitution . . .") . 
9 
Moreover, rehabilitative restitution need not be equal to the actual loss suffered by 
the victim. For example, in Twitchell, this Court upheld court ordered restitution, even 
though the victims suffered no out-of-pocket losses. There, defendant was an insurance 
broker who told policy holders that their premium payments were being used to purchase 
insurance coverage from legitimate, licensed insurance companies. Id. at 867. However, 
defendant actually kept most of the premiums and processed damage claims himself. Id. 
Fortunately, defendant was caught before any policy holders suffered losses. Id. 
Nonetheless, the trial court ordered defendant to pay $447,762.34 in restitution - an 
amount equal to the total premiums paid to the defendant, minus the amounts he either 
forwarded to legitimate insurance companies or that he used to pay claims. Id. at 868. 
On appeal, the defendant protested that restitution was improper where there were no 
losses. This Court disagreed, noting: 
"Restitution, in theory, may help rehabilitate the offender, 
there is a strong feeling that if the offender is made to suffer a 
loss and pay for the responsibility of the loss he caused, there 
is a greater likelihood he'll not do it again." 
Id. (quoting State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602,606-07 n. 6 (Or. 1981)). 
Here, the trial court had no choice but to impose restitution; defendant was 
convicted of criminal conduct that resulted in pecuniary damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(4)(a)(i) ("When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to another sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime ...") (emphasis added). Thus, 
10 
defendant's only conceivable complaint must go to the amount of restitution. However, as 
the Twitchell Court observed, the amount of restitution need not be precisely 
proportionate to the damage caused by the defendant when the goal of restitution is, in 
part, to rehabilitate the defendant and deter similar conduct. Accordingly, even if 
defendant could demonstrate that the trial court's factual findings concerning the amount 
of restitution was disproportionate, that alone does not demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion. 
In support of his argument that the trial court did not establish a causal relationship 
between his criminal conduct and the damage to the car, defendant cites State v. Martinez, 
2002 UT App 207 (Memorandum Opinion),2 and State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, fl-
3-5,987 P.2d 1289. However, both cases are distinguishable because the evidence in 
those cases failed to show any relationship between the defendants' admitted conduct and 
the losses suffered by the victims. 
In Martinezj the defendant was accused of welfare fraud, fraudulently obtaining 
medical benefits and attempting to distribute methamphetamine. Martinez, 2002 UT App 
at * 1. The defendant admitted to welfare fraud and attempted distribution of 
methamphetamine in exchange for dismissal of the charge of fraudulently obtaining 
medical benefits. The trial court, however, imposed restitution based on the defendant's 
supposed misrepresentations to her doctor to obtain drugs - allegations to which 
2
 Pursuant to Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, % 16,444 P.3d. 734, which 
allows citation to memorandum opinions, a copy of Martinez is attached as Addendum C. 
11 
defendant did not admit. Thus, this Court concluded: "It appears that in order to create a 
'sufficient nexus/ the court may have considered conduct beyond that which Martinez 
admitted." Id. at *2.3 
Similarly, in Watson, this Court reversed the restitution order because it bore no 
relationship to the conduct the defendant had admitted. There, the defendant was charged 
with criminal homicide and attempted criminal homicide because she allegedly drove two 
co-defendants to and from the crime scene. Watson, 1999 UT App at f 2. The defendant 
was also charged with obstruction of justice for selling the car used in the crime. Id. She 
pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of justice and was sentenced to pay restitution to 
the Victim's Reparation Fund in connection with the death of the murder victim. Id. This 
Court reversed, stating: 
To conclude that [defendant] admitted responsibility for the 
murder and that there was a sufficient nexus to hold her 
accountable to the victim's family for restitution, the trial 
court examined and made inferences about Watson's state of 
mind based upon the evidence before it However, the statute 
is more narrow. It does not ask the trial court to analyze a 
defendant's state of mind, but rather asks it to focus on 
admissions made to the sentencing court. In other words, the 
statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be 
firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court 
can order restitution. 
Id. at U 5 (emphasis added). 
3
 Because the rscord in Martinez was so unclear as to exactly what the defendant's 
fraudulent activities were, this Court remanded for further findings. Id. at *2. 
12 
As the Watson court made clear, the nexus requirement does not, as defendant 
contends, require a precise causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
losses to the victim. Rather, it requires that "responsibility for the criminal conduct be 
firmly established . . ." Id. (emphasis added). When, as is the case here, the defendant 
admits to criminal conduct that would allow the victim to recover damages in a civil 
action, the trial court has the discretion to impose both compensatory and rehabilitative 
restitution. Clearly, the trial court in this case did not abuse the broad discretion granted 
by the restitution statute. Accordingly, the restitution order should be affirmed and 
defendant's appeal dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
restitution order be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of September, 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
13 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities* means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facta or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and aa further defined in 
Subsection (4Xc). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages aa a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" doaa not include any (^participant in the defendant's 
criminal activitiea. 
(2) Within the limita preacribad by thia chapter, a court may sentence a 
erson convicted of an offense to any ona of the following sentences or 
ombination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) Thia chapter doaa not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property, 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (lXe). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4X0 and (4Xd). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant ails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department electa to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have die same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
(b) (i) If a defendant haa been extradited to thia state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he haa been' 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
d) <i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this»subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re* 
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply*. 
(i) the defendant it charted with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5XcXi) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime* 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, :he probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant nets, fai»iiu«wf 
(i) the <x»t of the cUuna^ or loss if the ofl^ nse resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and device* relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the incooae lost by the victim as a i^ult of tne offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cc«t of naceasary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the flu—wfoi resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
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Before Judges JACKSON. BILLINGS. 
andTHORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
JACKSON. Presiding Judge: 
*1 Martinez appeals the trial court's order 
requiring her to pay restitution to the 
Workers1 Compensation Fund (WCF) in 
the amount of $14,647. She challenges the 
sentencing court's "interpretation of the 
restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(4VaViU1999V when it ordered 
restitution ... related to criminal conduct 
for which [she] was not convicted, did not 
plead guilty, and did not admit 
responsibility." We remand.JFNil 
FN1. In light of this ruling, we 
decline to address Martinets 
remaining issues. 
We apply an abuse of discretion standard 
when reviewing an order of restitution. See 
State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273. f 7. 12 
P.3dll0. cert, granted, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 
2001): State v. Dominguez. 1999 UT App 
343. f 6. 992 P.2d 99S. However, ff[w]c 
review the trial court's interpretation of a 
[restitution] statute for correctness and 
accord no deference to its conclusions of 
law." State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930. 937 
Martinez pleaded guilty to Workers' 
Compensation Fraud, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-109(2) (1996V which 
provides in part: 
Any person who has intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly, devised any 
scheme or artifice to obtain workers' 
compensation insurance coverage, 
disability compensation, [or] medical 
benefits ... by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions, and 
who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly communicates or causes a 
communication with another in 
furtherance of the scheme or artifice, is 
guilty of workers1 compensation 
insurance fraud,... 
Id. Martinez supplemented her guilty plea 
with a statement of her conduct, stating: "I 
... obtained workers1 compensation benefits 
by working under an assumed name while 
rece iv ing benefi ts for being 
unemployable." (Emphasis added.) 
If Martinez's admitted criminal conduct 
resulted in pecuniary damages to WCF, 
then the sentencing court correctly applied 
section 76-3-20 K4VaVn and correctly 
concluded that restitution is appropriate. 
See State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273. Iflf 
3-5. 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam). 
Conversely, if Martinez's admitted 
criminal conduct bears no relationship to 
the damages suffered by WCF, then the 
court erroneously imposed restitution. See 
id. (requiring that defendant's admitted 
criminal conduct bear "sufficient nexus" to 
damages suffered by victim before court 
may enter restitution order). To determine 
whether a "sufficient nexus" exists 
between the defendant's admitted conduct 
and the claimed pecuniary damages, the 
sentencing court must determine that 
"liability is ctar aft a matter of law and 
[thatl commission of the crime clearly 
establishes causality of the mjury or 
damages." State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 
979. 983 (Utah Ct.App.l993V 
Martinez's statement ambiguously 
identifies the conduct that violated the 
Workers' Compensation Fraud statute 
because she does not state how her work 
under an assumed name obtained benefits, 
or exactly which benefits she "devised ... 
to obtain." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-109(2). 
She pleaded guilty to a separate charge of 
attempting to distnbutemethamphetamine. 
She did not plead guilty to fraudulently 
obtaining medical benefits. The record is 
unclear whether she was not entitled to 
prescription coverage due to her admitted 
conduct in working under an assumed 
name and attempting to distribute 
methamphetamine. It thus remains unclear 
whether the court could hold her liable for 
restitution. See Robinson. 860 P.2d at 983 
(requiring that commission of crime must 
"clearly" establish causality of pecuniary 
damages suffered by victim); see also 
Watson. 1999 UT App at f 5 ("[The 
restitution statute] does not ask the trial 
court to analyze a defendant's state of 
mind, but rather asks it to focus on 
admissions made to the sentencing court." 
(Emphasis added.)). 
*2 Further, the court's statements do not 
show us why Martinez's admitted conduct 
clearly establishes a nexus with the 
pecuniary damages suffered by WCF. It 
stated twice that the legal basis of its 
restitution order was the "fraudulent 
activities" Martinez engaged in. It also 
stated there was a nexus because Martinez 
"would not have received Oxycontin at all 
had she been forthright and had she not 
been engaging in fraudulent activities." 
The court reiterated that it was 
disingenuous for Martinez to expect 
payment after she had been deceitful and 
dishonest and that Dr. Dall "would not 
have prescribed the medication had he 
known all the circumstances." However, 
the court failed to explain what "fraudulent 
activities" it relied upon in imposing 
restitution, or how Martinez's statement 
admitted those "fraudulent activities." 
The restitution order seems to rest on the 
assumption that although Martinez was 
entitled to some pain medication, she was 
not entitled to Oxycontin because of her 
"fraudulent activities." Apparently, the 
court based its restitution order on 
allegations that Martinez somehow fooled 
Dr. Dall into prescribing Oxycontin or 
excess Oxycontin. However, the State 
dropped the charges relating to such 
misrepresentation and fraud in exchange 
for her guilty plea. It appears that in order 
to create a "sufficient nexus," the court 
may have considered conduct beyond that 
which Martinez admitted. 
Accordingly, "we remand this case to the 
trial court to conduct a restitution hearing 
in conformance with this opinion," State v. 
Mast 2001 UT App 402. If 25. 40 P.3d 
1143. to identify and explain (1) the nature 
and extent of Martinez's admitted conduct, 
[FN2] and (2) how that conduct "clearly 
establishes causality of the injury or 
damages" suffered by WCF. State v. 
Robinson. 860 P.2d at 983. 
FN2. The sentencing court must 
settle this question to satisfy the 
first prong of the Robinson test, 
which requires that "liability [must 
be] clear as a matter of law...." 
State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979. 
983 0JtahCt.App.l993Y 
WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS. 
Associate Presiding Judge and WILLIAM 
A. THORNE JR.. Judge. 
2002 WL 1291960 (Utah App.), 2002 UT 
App 207 
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